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An agent model to simulate water markets
Ivana Huskova, Julien J. Harou
University College London (i.huskova@ucl.ac.uk, j.harou@ucl.ac.uk)
Abstract: In many catchments in England no further licenses are available from
the Environment Agency (EA). The possibility of trading water between license
holders has been recognized as a potentially effective and economically efficient
strategy to mitigate increasing scarcity. However it is not clear what potential
trading has to meaningfully address the supply-demand imbalance in overabstracted areas. A screening tool that could assess the potential and
effectiveness of water trading in any catchment would be useful. We propose an
optimization-driven water market simulator that predicts economically efficient
pair-wise trade and represents its interaction with natural flows and engineered
infrastructure. The model emulates license-holders’ willingness to engage in
short-term trade transactions. In their initial form different ‘agents’ (license
holders) are represented using an economic benefit function of water use. The
working hypothesis is that trading behavior can be partially predicted based on
differences in marginal values of water over space and time. A case study based
on the river Dove Basin (UK) is made to test the model. The model which
simulates the catchment weekly over several years can also consider user
interactions with infrastructure (e.g. reservoirs) and user-defined transaction costs
between user-types or specific license holder pairs.
Keywords: water market, water rights trade, transaction costs, trading water,
hydro-economic modelling
1

INTRODUCTION

Many catchments in the UK, particularly in South East England, are considered
over-abstracted by the environmental regulator which results in restrictions on
existing abstraction; no new abstraction licenses are available. Water rights
markets have been recognized as potentially part of the solution to address
increasing water scarcity. It is not clear what potential trading has to effectively
address the supply-demand balance. A screening tool would help characterize the
potential and effectiveness of markets in a certain region.
We propose an optimization driven water market simulator that represents pairwise water trade within a catchment and its interaction with hydrologic flows and
engineered infrastructure. The model extends an existing flow-path water
resource network model (Cheng, 2009) which allowed tracking the start and end of
different water volumes thus allowing to track trade-type transactions. We
integrate that formulation to economic drivers – water abstractors execute those
trades that maximise economic value and are worth it given the cost of engaging
in the trade transaction. To attempt simulating markets we combine a flow-path
optimiser with a hydro-economic approach (Harou et al., 2009). The model treats
water demands as elastic, with the value of water to each user represented with
economic benefit functions.
Transaction costs shape market behavior by
preventing some otherwise optimal transactions and ensuring that a trade takes
place only if the incurred social benefits exceed the associated social costs (Colby,
1990). The model promotes water resources to be allocated in the most
economically efficient way within the catchment.
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Cheng et al (2011) applied their original flow path model to a options purchase
optimization problem for two municipal water agencies in Taiwan. Their approach
uses fixed water demands and minimizes the purchasing of options. The agencies
purchase options from one supplier; trade between the agencies was not
considered. This application demonstrated the flow path model’s usefulness in
representing situations involving water trading.
To demonstrate the use of a flow path model to simulate pair-wise trading we
propose a modified hydro-economic flow-path formulation and apply it to the River
Dove catchment in Central England. Section 2 describes the flow path water
market simulation model extension and filter algorithm to identify possible pairwise trades. Section 3 describes the model formulation. In Section 4 we apply the
model to the Dove catchment case study to demonstrate its applicability.
2

MODIFIED FLOW PATH MODEL

The flow path model proposed by Cheng et al (2009) is able to identify the
particular supplier, receiver and the path of delivery within the water network
system composed of nodes and directed arcs. The model proposed here makes 3
changes to the original formulation: 1. a single storage node is used, 2. water
demands are elastic, with decreasing returns to water deliveries, 3. custom
transaction costs between individual license pairs can be set, and 4. deviations
from storage targets are penalized to encourage the pragmatic operation of
reservoirs.
Cheng et al. (2009) use 2 dummy nodes, a reservoir supply node and reservoir
receiving node (Figure 1), to represent storage nodes. The inflows into the
reservoir are treated as the inflows into the receiving node while outflows from the
reservoir as outflows from the source node. The former at time step t becomes
water available for distribution at the reservoir source node at time step t+1
(dashed line in Figure 1). This requires two equations to handle the storage mass
balance. We simplified this mass balance down to 1 equation where the storage at
each time step is calculated simply as inflows – outflows + previous storage; the
single-node representation is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Reservoir representation in flow path model (left) and in the proposed
model (right).
The water demand was changed from fixed to elastic by allowing it to vary
according to water availability and marginal benefits. Water deliveries are the
difference between the inflows and outflows to and out of a demand node within
the same time step. Deficits are not allowed to promote trade between water
users. The modified model was then linked to Hydroplatform.
A barrier to water market simulation is the complex and hard to quantify aspect of
transaction costs as potentially transactions between individual users at different
times could engender different institutional costs. The costs represent effort by
regulators and/or transaction participants to agree to the transaction and its terms.
The proposed formulation includes a transaction cost function between each
unique pair of licenses which can be set with a unique initial cost (setting up a
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transaction, no matter the size has a startup cost) and linear slope (to account for
the fact that larger trades are likely to be more costly to engage) for each pair of
traders. Alternatively, transaction costs can be homogenized between different
user types (so that for example all agricultural to industrial trades have the same
transaction cost function). The initial costs of transactions are represented with a
step linear function using a binary variable.
Finally the deviation of reservoir storages from storage targets are minimized to
encourage the realistic use of reservoirs compatible with other uses including
water supply, flood control, recreation, etc. Target storage varies seasonally. In
this model reservoirs are included in the subset of nodes that can engage in water
sales. This is meant to represent the economic gains of having reservoirs under
consortium ownership where users can bid for reservoir water (perhaps managed
by a utility or 3rd party).
3

MODEL FORMULATION

The model was developed by improving and extending the original flow path
model (Cheng, 2009). The decision variable is the magnitude of flow through each
flow path represented as Xr. The start and end nodes of a flow path define the type
of delivery, i.e. river flow, abstraction, or trade. The important parameters are
valuei,k,t and volumei,k,t = benefit and volume value of the piece-wise linear benefit
function for node i at interval k at time step t, respectively, contr and linCoeffr =
constant and linear coefficient of the transaction cost function for each trade flow
path, and the seasonal target storage volume of reservoirs targetStori,t.
The objective is to maximize the total net benefits generated by trade while
minimizing the weighted deviation between actual and target storages:
(1)
where

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)

.
Subject to:
I.
River source mass balance
II.
Storage mass balance and capacity constraint
III.
Abstraction mass balance and constraints
IV.
License trade mass balance and constraints
V.
Demand mass balance and constraints
VI.
Catchment outflow mass balance and constraint
VII.
Link capacity constraints
Di is the set of all demand nodes, bi,t are the benefits generated by node i at time
step t, ATr is the set of all trade flow paths, cr,t are the transaction costs of path r at
time step t, Ωi is the storage deviation penalty weight for reservoir i, Ri is the set of
reservoir nodes, and Stori,t is the storage of reservoir i at time step t.
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Equations (2) to (4) represent the piece-wise linear benefit function where k is the
piece-wise interval, λi,k,t is the interval proportion, boughti,t, is the licensed volume
bought by node i at time step t from other demand nodes, and resBoughti,t is the
volume bought by node i at time step t from reservoirs.
Equations (5) and (6) represent the transaction cost function where yTransr,t is a
binary variable equal to 1 if Xr,t>0, 0 otherwise, penaltyr is the unit penalty cost for
penalized trade paths, Ux and Lx are suitable upper and lower bounds on the Xr,t
variable respectively.
Constraints implement the following rules in an attempt to simulate trading activity:
1. The maximum abstraction volume a demand node is set by its license.
2. A minimum use can be set to prevent certain low value uses to trade all of
their allocation during certain periods if this is found to be unrealistic.
3. Seasonal or time-step-specific minimum river flow requirements in the river
are represented with minimum capacity constraints.
4. A demand node can buy from other connected demand nodes or reservoirs
upstream.
5. Pair-wise trades are driven by benefits generated and transaction costs.
6. A demand node can either buy or sell a license in a single time step (but not
both to discourage intermediaries).
The following model assumptions are limitations of the current approach:
1. Trades are chosen by the model to maximise the region-wide benefits.
Individual gaming, rule-based or rent-seeking behaviour is not represented.
This model proposed here does not benefit from advances proposed by
adjacent fields such as game theory or multi-agent-based modelling.
2. Trade is allowed only in downstream direction even though in reality trades
could be made upstream if a down-stream user would forego abstraction to
allow an upstream user to abstract. Many of such upstream trades would be
poorly perceived by regulators, as the environmental effects of trade typically
worsen as abstraction moves upstream. In future work, ‘virtual’ (no cost – i.e.
no pumping involved) connections between downstream and upstream users
could be added to represent upstream trading when it is a realistic option.
3. Traders are myopic, they do not consider trading activity or water use in the
past or future, this is particularly unrealistic for users whose decisions in past
periods may cancel the need for water (e.g. farmer decisions may result in
changed water use or none at all if fields are fallowed). Inter-period decisions
are currently not modelled.
4

MODEL APPLICATION CASE STUDY

4.1 Dove catchment characteristics
The model was applied to a catchment modeled after the River Dove catchment in
the UK (1020 km2) (EA, 2006). Only surface water abstraction is modeled
represented by 52 surface water rights holders (or licensees) of 5 use types:
agriculture, amenity, industry, energy production and water supply. Each licensee
is bound by a maximum allowed abstraction volume and holds a CAMS status
(defined below). Two reservoirs, Tittesworth and Carsington are included in the
study. The largest abstraction point is at the bottom of the catchment and belongs
to the Severn Trent water company which provides commercial and domestic
water services. The modeled time period covers three consecutive years from 1st
January 2005 to 27th December 2007. This period includes critically dry conditions
in 2005 that improved over the following 2 years. A weekly time step was applied
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throughout the time horizon; the model considers trades each week. Minimum
flows were introduced at Q70, the flow rate that is exceeded 70% of the time.
4.2 Identifying allowable trades
To establish which pairs of licensees are able and allowed to participate in trades
we applied a filter algorithm illustrated in Figure 2. This filter attempts to emulate
EA water trading regulations.
In England and Wales abstraction is managed through the Catchment Abstraction
Management Strategies (CAMS) established by the EA. Every abstraction over 20
m3 of water per day must be licensed (EA, 2010). Licenses are granted according
to the water availability (taking into account the existing licenses within the
catchment and environmental needs) and the purpose of abstraction. The CAMS
level defines the level of abstraction stress the area is experiencing and is defined
on scale from 1 to 6 (1 = area where granting of new abstraction licenses can still
be considered, 6 = highly over-abstracted area where no further licenses can be
granted) (EA, 2010).

Figure 2. Filter algorithm to emulate which trades would be allowed by regulators.
The algorithm first evaluates if the pair of licensees is connected by a feasible
hydrological link. Then environmental constraints are incorporated such that only
trade possibilities where the seller has the CAMS status lower than 5 proceed into
the list of allowable trades. Trades where the seller has higher CAMS status than
the buyer to minimize the negative impact on the river are further penalized via
increased transaction cost where the unit penalty cost is added to the transaction
cost function (equation (5)).
4.3 Data on economic demands and transaction costs
The benefit functions of each licensee were derived using demand functions
estimated by the point expansion method using licensed abstraction volume and
literature water values (Table 1) for different water use types. Because each
licensee has a different licensed abstraction volume the estimated benefit
functions are unique to each licensee.
McCann and Easter (2004) recommend to analyze the types of transaction costs in
water markets of similar physical and institutional composition to estimate the
transaction costs for a new market. To further understand and measure these
costs the process of water market establishment should be monitored and
evaluated after the market’s full implementation. Transaction cost functions
between users of different types used in this study were postulated using data on
actual trades effectuated between 2004 and 2009. The proportion of the total
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traded volume during this period between different use types was consulted to
guess feasible unit transaction costs. These are given in Table 2.
Table 1. Water values and price elasticities of individual purpose types
Purpose
type

Water value p
3
(£/m )

Reference

Price
elasticity ε

Reference

Wheat
Barley
Sugar beet
Pasture irrigation
Golf course
irrigation
Average of selected
industries

0.027
0.021
0.066
0.031

(Gibbons, 1986)

-0.29

(Scheierling et
al., 2006)

0.128

(Watson, 2011)

-0.40

Assumed

-0.41

(Reynaud,
2003)

Energy

Hydropower

1.589

Water
supply

Commercial and
domestic

Agriculture

Amenity
Industry

Characteristics

0.144

0.435

(Moran and
Dann, 2008)
(Torcellini, 2003)
and British Gas
(Aylward, 2010)

-0.40

Assumed

-0.41

(Dalhuisen et
al., 2003)

Table 2. Transaction costs used in the study.
Between agriculture users

Fixed cost (£)
200

Other trades

10,000

3

Unit cost (£/m )
Seller
Agriculture
Amenity
Industry
Energy
Water supply
Reservoir

Agriculture
0
50
50
50
50
5

Amenity
50
4
15
50
50
5

Buyer
Industry
15
50
2
50
11
5

Energy
50
50
15
4
70
5

Water supply
50
50
15
50
9
5

4.4 Preliminary results
The interaction of trading activity with hydrological water availability and
engineered infrastructure is demonstrated in Figure 3. There is a correlation
between river flows, reservoir storage and trades volume; traded water increases
during wet periods when reservoir storages can easily meet their target values.
This suggests our winter water values may be too high or that transaction costs
should be increased to discourage winter trades which are less likely for some
sectors.

Figure 3. Trade, reservoir storages, and river flows over the modelled time
horizon.
Storage targets were set to be 80% of the maximum storage in autumn, full
storage in late winter, 70% in spring and 50% in summer. The behaviour of
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individual licensees: abstractions, buying, selling can be also reviewed for each
license or pair of licenses in each period. This behaviour is determined by the
benefit functions and transaction costs. The benefit functions drive the trade
towards downstream licensees with the highest marginal benefit from water use
although transaction costs reduce the number of trades proposed. The model
identifies the trades between individual market participants which can be
aggregated to look at trade between different use types.
Figure 4a shows the total traded volume over the modelled period between the
water use types and reservoirs. The energy production purchases the highest
volumes due to its high values. The transactions between agricultural licensees
are encouraged by their relatively lower transaction costs.
The influence of transaction costs on
the market participants’ behaviour
can be observed by a basic
sensitivity analysis. We increased
the slope of the transaction cost
function for trades between the
same use types by 1. The
corresponding trade volumes are
illustrated in Figure 4a and 4b. The
energy sector in Figure 4a is the
largest buyer (from reservoirs
mostly). These also trade with water
supply users who purchase
additional license from industry.
There is also a small proportion of
(a)
transactions between the same use
types, namely agriculture, industry
and water supply, due to lower
transaction costs postulated between
users of the same use type. The
total traded volume in Figure 4b
remained the same as in 4a but the
pairs that perform trades change.
Water supply licensees with low
marginal values no longer trade their
excess license with the same use
type but instead sell to industrial
users. The transactions between
industrial users also slightly
(b)
decreased. These changes occur
because the marginal benefits of
Figure 4. Total traded volume over the
water use decrease in magnitude
whole modelled time horizon between
with increasing volume while the
different use types and reservoirs (a).
transaction costs increase linearly.
Total traded volume over the whole
Thus increasing the transaction
modelled time horizon with increased
costs makes some trades that
transaction cost for trade paths between
previously generated benefits to
same use types (b).
become unprofitable. The model
provides detailed information about
which particular licensees engage in what trades in each time step.
5

CONCLUSION

This study proposes a river basin simulator that attempts to integrate water rights
or license trading considering pair-wise trading driven by economic benefits from
water use and transaction costs. We demonstrated its applicability with a case
study of the UK’s Dove river basin. The model simulates trades that increase
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regional economic benefits from water use whilst considering the interaction of
trading with the catchment’s natural hydrology and engineered infrastructure. The
importance of benefit functions and transaction cost data as model drivers was
illustrated on the magnitude and distribution of individual trades.
Future work could involve more sophisticated representation of individual water
rights holders to reflect more realistic agent behaviour. The complexity of the
model strongly depends on the spatial scale of the modelled water system; the
current flow path approach requires further modifications and improvements to
minimize this limitation. Economic benefit functions of water use and transaction
costs need to be improved for results to better approximate realistic conditions.
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